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Monday, March 10, 2014

Some Thoughts on Writing: Practicing It and Recognizing the Tricky Balance Between Being Idealistic and Realistic in Non-Fiction Storytelling


[Journal entry 2/23/14]

I want to practice writing more. I don't know if I'll do it in this journal or a notebook, but I'll likely start by asking a question and then practice writing by answering it. One of my goals will be brevity- to select key points and apply just the right amount of explanation; another goal will be structure- knowing more quickly how I want to present something so that I can narrow in on key points. Another general goal I have is to try to maintain a sort of experiential truth to my writing. We all know how the way you write about an event you experienced can make it seem more fun or dramatic than it was in your experience.

It's tricky though, because part of the joy of reading and the skill in writing is to be able to present things with a certain ideal or value in mind- in a sense so as to train oneself by the reading of it to then see the world more in that manner. But I wonder if even this way of handling writing can be done in better and poorer ways- not by degree of affect but by a certain sort of honesty in presentation. I already mentioned how events can be recalled in a way that might have a desired effect, yet fail to maintain a sort of honesty. It's one thing to recall the highlights of an event, but another to present the mundane things in a non-mundane manner- one is selective, the other almost deceptive.

One way of addressing this latter concern could be to present the mundane as it is, but to add commentary to it in a way that makes it clear that the desired effect is distinct from the event; this might involve including the author's voice, but doesn't have to. For example, this following example could be a way of focusing on the highlights of an event without being deceptive concerning the mundane:  "the line was long, and it gave me a sense of how busy and crowded it would soon be in the building. The long wait was soon forgotten in the excitement of seeing the admired comedian take the stage."

I'll leave myself to explore more later, but some routine quick writing practices should prove beneficial. Part of my interest in this is because I was filling out a resume cover letter yesterday and noticed that I wasn't as readily able to select the key points I wanted, and to decide how to present them, as I'd like to be.

Friday, March 07, 2014

Poem


[01/02/14]

A cool breeze on my face-
stirs me,
makes me feel,
the moving forces,
in this world;
and I remember things,
and dream.

The dual role of moral drive and intellectual consideration in one's decision making


[first posted 12/11/13]

The distinction between, or dual operation of, the moral and intellectual reasons for decisions and behavior. There's a sense in which we're rational and hold ourselves to it- even demanding intellectual understanding for things we might believe; I think there's also a moral dimension that drives our decisions and can include or not include intellectual understanding- a sense, whether intellectually verified or not, that we ought to behave in a certain way- either somewhat inherent or contingent- a natural moral sense or also a contingent moral sense which assessing that if something is true then it requires a certain moral behavior from me, which then may be acted upon even without intellectual understanding. One may be acting morally while still working out their intellectual understanding, and they may or may not continue their behavior based on the role they think intellectual understanding should play- but I at least think its a peculiar (at least to say not everyone takes account of and appreciation for the fact) aspect of being human (finite, temporal/in-time, yet rational) that we're sort of forced to make, or to forego, decisions about things we don't fully understand. So I think there is a role for moral and intellectual drive in our decision making process; or perhaps may be distinguished as moral drive and intellectual consideration- which then becomes part of our moral drive. I think one could then operate on one and not the other- one could be acting on moral (natural or contingent) drive while working out intellectual consideration/understanding; also, one may believe something (or understand) intellectually without acting on it morally (and I use "moral" somewhat loose, like ethical, but not excluding traditional sense of right/wrong, but including more- like ones contingent goals, or subjective/objective sense of duty, etc.). This would include someone intellectually having reason for something- exercising for health, recycling for ecology, etc., but not acting on it- perhaps not having moral reason for it, which seems almost ironic but this occurs and thus may suggest another element of decision making- that which affects our use of moral sense and intellectual consideration- our values. Thus you may sense or know something but not value it. The other consideration might be that someone who intellectually understands something but doesn't morally respond doesn't actually intellectually understand. So the relationship between moral drive and intellectual understanding may need to be further understood to assess how they correlate to decision making.
[. . . a thought; please take with a grain of salt, take it for what it's worth]

A thought on, but not full consideration of, the value of studying


[first posted 12/10/13]

Some consider knowledge and contemplation of the truth to be inherently valuable- that it is self-fulfillingly valuable. While I think that is a worthwhile consideration and aims at a higher role of knowledge and understanding (and thus study), the following is more of a consideration about the mediate role of studying, which would well include higher purposes of study, but is focused more on resolving, to an extent, mundane concerns, which would point one to the possible pursuit of further and higher considerations. The following is an idea I wrote out a little while back:

4/26/13     Part of my interest in studying is because of my sense that a lot of our time is wasted on dealing with solvable problems, which keeps us from putting our attention on life's bigger purposes- both personal and universal; it doesn't have to, we could have ourselves not be distracted by the various temporal issues in our life, though they remain, and in that regard I don't think extensive studying is a necessary interest for everyone to have, assuming a general sufficient ability for one to take care of their self without wasted attention- by desiring to focus on other things, and by hopefully having less temporal things to cause difficulty for them by the shared and trusted insight of one who studies and practices to master them to a degree. However, to the extent that a person chooses not to be distracted by such issues nor to put an effort to work toward understanding and mastering them, they may more likely be hindered to a degree in their natural efforts in, and attention to, bigger things. The problem, however, concerning wasted time on solvable problems, I believe is sometimes catalyzed by a moral dimension- that people use daily temporal issues to arrest their attention from bigger purposes, and do not desire to overcome, to a reasonable extent, these temporal issues so that they could then put attention on life's bigger purposes. This isn't to say that sometimes this issue isn't owing to ignorance or lack of means, or injustice, etc. "Temporal issues" generally I mean to refer to things we often consider a means to our ends- such as health (and thus diet, exercise, rest, mental, etc., the more temporal aspects of health, as opposed to social, spiritual, etc.), finances, politics, industry, etc.; and by "bigger purposes" generally I mean to refer to things that would be the ends of the temporal things of life (the things that are the ultimate reason for the other things we do), such as love, worship, one's calling/service (which may have its own bigger purpose but is the purpose of the things used for it), community/family, justice, etc. I'm not so much talking about specialized study which might pertain to a career/calling, but rather am generally talking about the effort to understand and improve one's temporal issues so that they don't actually end up taking away more effort and time by neglecting or being distracted by them. But unless a peculiar similar issue arise- becoming obsessed with temporal improvement, so that it ends up consuming more and providing less in the realm of bigger purposes than it would have otherwise, its important to engage in and pursue what matters (assuming it's true, good, and beautiful), and to occasionally ask "what am I living for?"

In Defense of Emotion


[first posted 09/14/13]

[Again, this note comes to you as an extracted note/comment, because I wanted to write a brief little essay (this hardly qualifies, but is enough for now of what I wanted to express) about some insights I had regarding emotion and it's role in understanding, particularly in response to the sentiment that reason and emotion are opposed forms of understanding with the latter often being false and unreliable; I attempt to challenge that sentiment with some insights (while agreeing that there are occurrences of illegitimate emotional consideration). The first paragraph is just a post that I'll include because it gives some context and leads into the following paragraph which is a comment that expounds some points I wanted to make]

A day or so ago I was thinking about the role of emotions in one's rational life, mostly as a response to the sentiment that intellectuals sometimes take on- a sense of putting reason above "irrational emotions", which I might agree with except that the sentiment seems to hold all emotional considerations as suspect, or, if not, would at least hold only the role of reason as valid for understanding. So I thought about writing a brief essay of thoughts on the topic, to title it "In Defense of Emotion" and include some of the insights that had come to mind as well as to develop some more upon consideration. But then I went to the thrift store, where I came across a copy of Martha C. Nussbaum's "Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions" and, yeah, the 700 pages and seemingly thoughtful writing at glance either has me thinking she did a fair enough job discussing the topic in that book, or that I dare not take on the task of bringing my thoughts on the subject that far- I have no idea perhaps how small a task her work may have begun as, and since I don't get paid to write that may just be a recipe for poverty. This is me thinking about it now; at the time my emotions went from a moderately delighted surprise at the topic to a slightly disconcerted daunting at the contents, and I suspect there was a degree of intelligence in that emotion.

Note: I want to emphasize that I sympathize with the concern over irrational emotional consideration; my point, though, would be that not all emotional considerations are necessarily this way, just like not all thoughts are valid (hence, it goes both ways). Part of the insight I have in mind is that emotions are feelings but not all feelings are emotions (it makes sense to talk about your emotions as feelings you're having, but doesn't always make sense to talk about your feelings as emotions- for example, you wouldn't say "I have a funny emotion in my arm"). This is because I think that emotions involve the mind, that they're partly psychological, and feelings not necessarily so- perhaps associated with your nervous system but not necessarily your mind/psychology, at least not in the way I have in mind; you could say that some feelings are reflexive, where as emotions are reflective (but not to say not also reflexive in some way).

And this gets to another point which Nussbaum discussed in the brief portion I looked over (although she handles it in a little bit of a different way)- that part of the problem in a poor perception of emotion is in viewing it merely physiologically- that someone's sadness is just a chemical in the brain causing such and such effect. Rather a more legitimate view of emotion is to see the way in which it is more than that. That's not, for me at least, to say that there is something of emotion entirely non-physical (in itself, not addressing whether it correlates to things non-physical) but that to attempt to make sense of emotion by merely looking at it's physical and physiological make up, is to not make sense of what emotion is in its correlation to the experience causing it. Since emotion (if you reduce it to its physiological make up) isn't its own autonomous occurrence (in regards to what I'm referring to, I'm not denying that there may be emotions which are primarily physically caused and then affect the mind rather than the other way around) and thus to discern whether emotion has a legitimate role in one's understanding it is helpful to understand the experience correlating to it (and I'm including ideas as part of the experience, so as not to reduce experience down to merely the aspects that don't have individual involvement).

And, to be brief, the experience would be a correlation of one's environment, their perception of it, and then their physical responding (reflexive) and mental processing (reflective) of it. And thus emotion isn't merely the chemistry and processes going on in your body, but is also the reflection of your sense of the quality of the thing you're emotionally responding to- which is a process that involves your ideas/beliefs/knowledge/reason/etc. And this is where I would argue that emotion isn't necessarily an invalid form of understanding- that it involves your reasoning to some degree and thus isn't merely some uncontrolled physiological mechanism that has nothing but merely accidental correlation to critical assessments of what is true. I do think that there is a good sense in which the validity of someone's thinking may correlate to the validity of their feeling, so I do think there are cases where one's emotions aren't valid assessments of what is deemed true of something by them; but I don't totally exclude the idea that the validity of each isn't necessarily directly tied to the other.

This is an expounded form of the insight I had that I wanted to elaborate in an essay- which I'm not sure would've been too much more than what I've just written.


*Regarding what I said- "And, to be brief, the experience would be a correlation of one's environment, their perception of it, and then their physical responding (reflexive) and mental processing (reflective) of it." I should correct this by saying this would be an example that shows an experience correlating to emotion, but that one's experience doesn't necessarily always include their reflection on their environment but may rather include their reflection on things abstract/non-physical, or internal reflection as well.

Thoughts on infinity, mostly infinite divisibility and the puzzle of traversing infinite halfway points between two points.


[first posted 12/18/12]

[some thoughts I wrote down when thinking about the subject (some editing), so it's kind of stream-of-thought but still focused. Some terms are used loosely, especially the word "mass." I know the paradox of half-way points has been solved by math but I haven't looked it up, if you know something about it and have insight feel free to share, or if you think I'm mistaken on a thought feel free to share.]

Infinity is an unattainable possibility from parts, it may be attainable by something infinite- perhaps by shared identity (infinity as attained by the corresponding concept of it vs. unattainable by the composition of finite parts since the composition of the finite parts will be a larger but finite whole). Shared identity means that the attaining of infinity by an infinite object doesn't mean that an object attains infinity as an act but by identity- by being what the meaning of the concept is (concept of infinity). Infinity is a possibility insofar as it's not logically impossible, but unattainable insofar as the attaining object is incompetent or insufficient. Infinite divisibility suggests that an object is infinitely divisible- divisible without end, not possibly not divisible after any number of divisions. This is true at least conceptually concerning the division of something's mass (or size?). But it is unattainable as each division decreases the mass of the part and will never collectively occupy a state of having been infinitely divided- each part's mass decreases without end as the number of parts increases without end, respectively, but the multiplication of the two (number of parts times amount of mass of each part) will equal the initial mass (conceptually, not considering a real occurrence of inefficiency). A finite object (material, or conceptually limited) will have a mass (limited correspondence to other objects). No matter how infinitely divided the mass is merely distributed. Insofar as points are concerned (as opposed to divisions with mass implications)- such as in the paradox of the impossibility of traversing an infinite number of points, if the point has no reference to a division of mass then it doesn't partake of the object it points to and thus poses no problem for traversing since there's nothing to be traversed. Insofar as it points to the object as an act of reference, the properties of the object in consideration are what determine if it may be traversed- and as a finite object the proposed problem of infinite points is not a problem since it doesn't correlate to an infinite mass (distance) to be traversed, even if the points don't just refer to the whole object but infinitely small (with respect to infinitely many points) (infinitely small doesn't necessarily imply zero, but it would seem that a point that is utterly without reference to any mass of the object pointed to, thus an utter point, points to nothing, but does it still refer to something? And thus these infinite references without mass can refer to an object with its given mass- in regard to a set domain of infinite points?). In this case an infinite number of points is traversed whenever any amount of mass (distance) is traversed, so instead of not being able to traverse an infinite set of points you actually can't help but do so.The question becomes whether on can traverse anything, since anything is infinitely divisible. And as an object of mass that can travel, by moving myself from one area of mass to another, that are at a distance from one another, I can traverse areas of mass (distance) and thus I can traverse infinite points as well. An object can be infinitely divided but its mass is merely distributed- neither decreased or increased; thus two different objects of different mass can be infinitely divided but will not change in correspondence of mass.

However, is mass merely relative? Two objects with different mass (size) that are separated from everything will be identical in attributes (considering mass (size) is the only difference) internally- its relation to itself, but not externally (its relation to other fixed objects, including each object to each other). If the ratio of difference between the two was afforded to identical items (except by comparative mass) that they correspond to (but in different domains- all objects associated to one object not associated with any objects associated with the other) then the respective realities, with no shared internal or external correspondence, would be the same- so is mass relative? It's the idea that if everything doubled in size (which seems to imply all properties) then nothing would be different, or that it wouldn't matter. As for infinite multiplication- you could conceptually multiply an item into double infinitely but this now affects other objects since it doubles the mass and increases the size- thus competing for space (domain). As you can infinitely divide all objects without difficulty you cannot infinitely multiply all objects (without multiplying the domain infinitely). Objects can be infinitely divided since the parts of the division already occupy an existing domain and thus don't affect it (change correspondence to it). Multiplying an object would seem internally consistent and thus beckons again whether mass is relative, since you could effectively double something by decreasing everything else in half. However, this consideration is not opposite. Infinitely dividing an object deals with its parts, internal, it is not about shrinking the object, thus multiplying an object would not be correlatingly contrary but rather synthesizing- connecting parts; but this would have resolution, not an infinite possibility as with division- assuming there are finite parts.

You can count infinitely with all sequential numbers as well as you can with all even or odd numbers alone. Something infinitely divided, in this consideration, starts as a whole object- and you divide without end; but you don't start with infinitely divided objects to synthesize to a whole (since arriving at a whole implies a finite process of synthesis- since you arrived; infinite division goes without end, infinite synthesis would not yield at a whole without failing to have been infinite; yet you also never arrive at infinity- infinitely divided). This is considering processes of division or synthesis, since it corresponds the parts of the process with time and the parts are infinite, the time will be infinite and thus never attained. But when the infinite division or synthesis is an identity it is immediate, precluded from time. So the concept of an infinitely divided or synthesized object is possible and attainable as an identity- that it is something (either inherently or as a considered domain) that is composed of or divisible into an infinite number of parts. Conceptually at least; if you could reduce matter into indivisible parts then the physical application of infinite divisibility may look different than its application to immaterial objects, but if there were indivisible objects they may not be so due to small size (whatever size, could you not conceive of smaller?) but their nature (having indivisible power as opposed to size) or because of there being no relative object that is competent to divide- such as an object smaller or stronger so as to divide, even though a smaller or stronger object is conceivable (this latter may be incidental indivisibility, the former could be inherent indivisibility, owing either to something like God's decree or to limitations of physics, or both correspondently.) The attainability of this possible infinity by identity can be conceived by a number, "one" for example, that is infinitely divisible but is immediately composed of the sum of all its divisibility.

Another consideration on synthesis would be the nature of an object. It seems more clear to conceive of infinite division of an object but less clear to synthesize two objects that differ in function. The parts of a chair are one thing, and synthesizing a chair and a table as a set is also not so unclear, or even all the things in a house as stuff that someone owns (although the correspondence is different- being stuff owned as opposed to a table and chair serving a purpose of a place to eat), or all things as stuff that exists; but even in these syntheses the parts of the whole seem distinctly different than the parts of these parts (a chair as part of the things you own versus all the parts that make up the chair to the point of infinite divisibility). It wouldn't make as much sense to talk about half of a chair as part of stuff you own (when you own the whole chair). Also, if someone asks you to bring them a book its not problematic, but if they ask for the leg of a chair (even for a feasible use) it will be more difficult since it must be removed and will likely damage an object (which may vary in concern based on one's value of or relations regarding the object; but being able to maintain synthesis is thus functionally important). So it seems to make more sense to talk about wholes when it bears a certain nature of being a whole, at least relative to its use as a whole considering the reference. To talk about the parts of a whole makes some sense when applicable, but to synthesize two wholes as a whole would make less sense (considering the situation . . . .) but as a set, more so. Maintaining the creative ability to think about the truth of something different from its use can be of value, to mistakingly think of some things as a whole (thus implied shared nature) when they bear distinct inherent and intended purposes may be hindering (to be able to do so is one thing, to do so mistakingly rather than understanding the more pertinent qualities and nature of the parts is another; and on the contrary to think of some things only as distinct parts to the extent of missing their synthesized function can also be problematic).


[additional thoughts I wrote down another day after thinking more about it, more succinct, didn't elaborate]

The infinite division is separate from the rate of motion of an object travelling a distance, and the competency of the combined rates of motion and time traveled to traverse a distance is correspondent to that distance which is the sum of the infinitely divided half-way points. Also, if considering an object's travel in correspondence to the infinite division- as the object approaches its end of distance the half-way points become infinitely small and thus the speed and time required to cross them becomes infinitely less, and given the finite distance altogether it is traversable.


*I'm not sure how clear it was, but the problem I'm assessing is the paradox that says that you cannot travel from one point to another, since in order to do so you will have to reach the half way point between those two points, and once you've reached that halfway point there will be another halfway point from there to the destination, and so on and so on, so that you never traverse all the halfway points between where you started and where you're going since at each halfway point you reach there is another halfway point from there to the destination, which is an infinite process and thus one cannot travel from one point to another.

*In short: an infinite number of halfway points can be traversed because they occupy a finite domain, and the rate of motion of the traversing object is separate from the rate of division (not slowing down according to the distance of halfway points) and is sufficient to reach the destination in a finite (and preferably pertinently short) amount of time.

thoughts on first cause, ideas concerning evolution, life, motion, big bang, and origins


[first posted 06/20/12]

[this is a copy/paste of a comment(s) I made on a post, but only a few remarks should seem out of place for that reason, everything else should be straightforward; there's a correction at the end, as originally posted, so preferably read the whole thing.]

Thanks for the references.

I think the difference between creationists and evolutionists is on a philosophical level, which I think could be reflected in whether or not one thinks the world can explain itself.

I think that seeing how the world is now can help us to understand what something is, which can help us understand how it could be what it is.If one only sees the world as matter and form then one might seek to understand the nature of that matter and the cause for its form.In this case we don't seem to have experience with observing matter being created or destroyed, but we observe the creation/destruction of form. (perhaps with a sentiment of exception with living things- a little twig in the ground becoming a huge tree, you may say that wood is matter and in this case we could at least say it grew, but might have difficulty saying it was created- in the sense of matter coming to be from non-matter)Seeing life as matter and form we may seek to understand the cause of life starting with what we have experience in perceiving cause of- form.We could say that life is cyclical, and so the pattern we see of a life coming from its parent has always occurred without beginning (so there being no beginning to form); but the difficulty with this is that it seems impossible for there to be a real infinite progression as the preceding explanation for the current form of matter, since changing form is motional and this does not account for the cause of motion.If the cyclical paradigm is impossible then we search for origins, the cause of change of form (motion).Evolution may seek to explain the processes of change back to this point (whether correctly or not), but motion (change of form) is part of life- if you only have matter and form and no motion then you have a static object which can't be accounted as a cause for other objects (objects which come to be).

And this may be where an essential aspect of the argument lies; matter could conceivably be thought to always exist- to just be, form would just be the shape/position that the matter takes, and in this sense the two would seem to be an inseparable whole (albeit composed of parts) that could've always existed (if it could be conceived to be a self-explained object, something not caused, only things that come to be, that have an origin/beginning, are caused, being the effect of the nature and conditions of the thing preceding (you could say that the cause and effect are just the same object, so it's just the nature of that object being what it is, which is motional, but I've already tried to explain why it doesn't seem that a motional object can be eternal, because it will always have effects preceded by causes which can't have gone on forever, there's a beginning to sequences- if the parts of the sequence are causally related, and all of which ultimately abide or come from a cause that is not itself part of the causal sequence or object)). But motion is not the sort of thing that is self-explained; it seems, by its nature, to be causally-related and contingent and thus not a part of an origin.Here I'm not really even talking about evolution anymore except to explain that the concept of evolution is itself a concept of change which demands a higher explanation for what's causing it (and if you say that it's simply the nature of the object acting itself out, as it gains nutrients and grows, that's fine but that doesn't explain where the motion is coming from- unless you would say that there is a spirit/will in that object that causes some of it's some of its movements; but take a plant for example, take a seed that is in the ground, assuming that it doesn't seem to have any will/spirit what causes its motions? It seems there is something about the seed- the matter and mechanism of it- it's structure in such a way that when it is in soil and gets enough water then that mechanism is set into motion somehow- so there is something about the objects involved- the structure and matter of the seed and the matter of the soil and water, and when they interact there is a motion that occurs in the seed. And in this case motion occurs, by nature of the objects, but occurs when they're put in order/connected; so this would explain complex motion but still depends on the motion of whatever caused the seed, the soil, and the water to be moved into that relations, so albeit complex it still backs up the question of motion to another cause and, perhaps, a first cause).So, going back to origins, the explanation of motion, it seems that there would need to be an object which was not motional (so as to actually account for the origin of motion, if motion is involved in the original object then you're not talking about the first motion, and the other option is to say there was no first motion and that motion is eternal, but I've already offered a concern for that. So the cause of the first motion cannot itself be motion, so I'll just call it the cause).Some scientists have attempted to answer this in terms of the Big Bang- dense matter as the cause that expanded into being the motional universe. But this explanation doesn't seem to be self-explainable; first, you can't say that something motional from without or within caused this occurrence, or else you're no longer talking about the first motion and we should instead talk about that object and not the Big Bang. You can say it just happened; but was there a moment preceding this happening? If not then there is no origin- origins talk about the beginning of something that was once not; to say there was no state preceding the Big Bang's explosion/expansion is to go back to saying that motion has always been. If so, then some conditions changed so as to implicate the motion of the Big Bang, something made a difference such that a difference occurred- going from static dense matter to expanding/exploding matter. But again, those conditions can't be physical or else they are a preceding motion and the Big Bang would thus not be the first motion since there is a prior motional cause. So there is something that implicated the conditions for motion, without itself being motion, and this would then be a non-physical cause (since if physical, and without motion involved, either no Big Bang could then occur and thus no motion ever occur or there could be no state prior to the Big Bang and thus you're left with there always having been motion- which I strongly suggest as impossible, especially in this consideration since the Big Bang is a singular event and would defy the concept of eternal flux/motion). If a non-physical cause, yet a cause, you then begin to wonder what sort of being (being as opposed to thing, things are contingent, or else have no power to act; and an act is a word I'm using to express the reason for the difference between the conditions/nature of things preceding the Big Bang and those implicating it; if the Big Bang, as such, even occurred; I know of some Christians who believe so, but have a different view of it in terms of this explanation of it's cause as the first motion (referring to William Lane Craig), but whether the Big Bang as we know of it occurred or not the point I'm making about a first motion and the relation to its cause is the same. And in considering this first cause it seems to be a being with a will and also an eternal being- since I'm not talking about the first cause of motion concerning Earth or it's living parts which might suggest another contingent being such as an alien, but the first cause for the first motion, the origin of motion.


*In rereading the first part so far I made a mistake, or incomplete point- the problem of an infinite progression of cause/effect to get to where we are now is not impossible by virtue of accounting for where motion comes from but by virtue of the impassibility of infinity. In a causal sequence you can't have an infinite series of causes and effects to get to a particular cause/effect; if illustration is helpful, it's like asking "how many left turns did you make before making a right turn?" and the answer being "an infinite number of left turns"; infinity is by definition inexhaustable, without end, if there is no end to the measure of the cause it will never be complete so as to sufficiently bear its effect.

knowledge, perception, thoughts on deception, attempt at establishing a basis for objectivity


[first posted 06/18/12]

[all of the following was originally a response/thought comment on a post]:

Well there's a difference in discussing the truth or validity of a thing, which assumes your ability to know in some way and then whether you can know specifically the thing in question; it's another thing to attack knowability itself, the ability for any knowledge or truth, or perception of anything beyond one's self- the very assertion of which defies itself by speaking about something other than itself, and even elsewise would be admitting something about the nature of that person's self. There could be an honest confusion that the person thinks that because everything they know is something that, in order to know, comes TO THEM they therefore don't perceive it in anyway beyond their self and therefore have no confidence that it is anything beyond their self; but it would seem that any measure of discernment admits, rather demonstrates, that that isn't the case entirely- for if in seeing those things coming to you and not knowing if they were ever apart from you (for example "is this all just my imagination?") and thus not being able to solidify any of those things as objective truth then your doubt itself would be dismissed by the same means since it's something arising from you and how then could it be ANYTHING (objective) in its claim about your situation- it would never "be the case" that you couldn't know. It would seem the only way to really be deceived is to not have any ability whatsoever to discern your deception- because for the moment you suspect you're entirely deceived, if you are, you have become aware of one true and undeceived point- that you're deceived- and if that were true then why not just believe the opposite of everything you believe? But maybe you're only deceived about some things, but then now you're admitting that there are even more things you're not deceived about, and if deception is trickery and knowledge is not, then you must not be tricked into knowing things that are true but really know them and if that's the case then there is a genuine means by which you know the things you do know, and so you should be able to think of what those things are- not that you have full and exhaustive knowledge of the things you know, but you have knowledge of something of them (and something that is not reduceable to just being a part of you but the thing outside you that you're perceiving). This perception of something might be, from what I'm gathering, what Aquinas would call a perception of "Ens" a word meaning something like "being" but captures the notion of the thing itself, of its essence- so maybe you aren't necessarily so readily perceiving a whole lot of "what it is" but you readily regard something of "that it is"; I could be wrong, I'm new to Aquinas and what he thought.

Let me address preemptively two possible concerns- 1, what if the things I know are actually known by trickery and so there's still no legitimate method for knowledge? 2, what if it's a greater deception to think that I know I'm not deceived because of my awareness of deception, but I actually am deceived?

1, for this I just have a couple thoughts. You may accept a true conclusion but for false reasons. And, you may know a true conclusion but not see it as a conclusion and have no need for its reasons. Accepting a true conclusion but on the basis of its false reasons, and having no experience or true reason for the conclusion otherwise, it would seem you don't know that the thing you accept is true. But you do accept it, and so as soon as you act on it and it is verified then now you actually have reasons to know the thing you accepted. So say someone says a magical bird put a ball in a basket, and so you believe there is a ball in that basket; say there actually is a ball there, you accept that there's a ball there but only because you heard that the magic bird put one there- so your accepting it depends on the reason for why you think it's there, then you don't know its there. But say you act on this acceptance and open the box and there's a ball, well now (to the extent that you perceive the ball, and that it is a ball) you know its there, and now you can dismiss those false reasons and know it based on these true reasons (that it's a ball and you have truly perceived it). But say that a good friend or trusted relative, who doesn't usually intend to mislead you, has told you this same story about the bird to get you to accept that there's a ball in the basket. Now you're not merely accepting the conclusion by those reasons alone, but because of the reason for those reasons being suggested- the former reason being that this trusted person tells you things to lead you to true thoughts. Now you accept the conclusion with mixed reasons, one of which is reliable and the other not- one being because your trusted person told you and the other being the reasons they told you (the magic bird); let it be noted that the trusted person's emphasis was on the conclusion and so the implication in this communication was obvious that he was wanting the conclusion to be accepted albeit the reason given was fanciful and doesn't line up with common experience. So now in this case you accept a true conclusion, but not for reasons that logically imply it but which do strongly suggest it- your trusted person's explanation; here I might say that one doesn't know the ball to be there but believes it, and the validity of the belief is correlated to the integrity of the reason for the belief- but not logical reason but social/relational/authoritative/trust/etc. reasons; and say you come to realize the story that person gave is false but it is understood it wasn't intended strongly to be the thing to accept then you pass it by knowing the implication of the suggestion was to accept the conclusion- now your belief is the same, and the reason for it, but it has been clarified; so though that there is logical reason to believe the conclusion and it is given to you by the same person now that you've grown and can better understand, now your belief has been strengthened, and if truly logically implied then to the extent that the premises are known then you know the conclusion; the same can be said for if you directly experience the conclusion- you see the ball in the basket (in this case I'm not sure there could be a logical implication for a material situation like that, but an experiential one is plausible). More could probably be said but I'll leave it there for now.

On to the second point, you may know a true conclusion but not see it as a conclusion and have no need for its reasons. Here I'm basically just narrowing in on a specific point of the first explanation- that if you truly perceive the real thing then you have knowledge of it, at least that it is and from there you may distinguish many more things about it (at least "that it is" it is something, and not just you in this case, and you're perceiving it; let me make a note on hallucination, you may say "what if I think I see something that isn't really there, a hallucination" then I would suggest that the error arises at the point you take that thing to be "something else"- something associated with things other than you; "how do I know that everything isn't a hallucination?" if it were you couldn't know it- but the fact that we know that if it were you couldn't know it seems to suggest that we truly know something about it, which suggests that it is in fact something, and something to know and thus not a hallucination- in fact I think that in a hallucination everything would seem more real, that is that you would accept everything without distinction or qualification, because everything is only appearances and nothing is distinct from anything else as "being something" but is all one collective illusion whereby no discernment would have a foothold for criticism; perhaps this is why dreams seem "so real" until we wake up, but notice you're not questioning the reality of things in your dream when you're dreaming; so the fact that we do perceive ourselves as existing and as distinct and that things seem to differ in what they are and how we know them, that we don't accept everything at face value be try to perceive what things are and understand what things might just be personal sentiment, etc., seems to suggest that we live in a real world where we are different from the things around us, and they from each other, but we and they are related to others (and in many ways dependent, generally and materially speaking: food, shelter, water, etc., which may also suggest a distinction between ourselves and those things, that we change/suffer/benefit/etc. in part when we do or don't have certain resources, and if it were illusion- illusions aren't things that have properties in relation to each other, unless you suggest that psychologically we formulate those properties and thus those things have rules in our mind, in that sense I would hope we could perceive the difference but I'd also say that what if everything in this world is an expression of the mind of God with it's correlating properties allotted to those things?))2, I think I've already answered this but I'll say that if our conviction of the inability of deception by things we experience that we consider contrary to the nature of a deception is itself a deception- then this is not anything more extensive than just to recast the problem in a more complex way, that we are deceived and there's no way to know it, but even if we are to accept that notion as true we would have to admit that we know something about the situation or possibility of how things might be (that we're deceived) in which case we aren't totally deceived. So if you want to defeat the possibility of deception, just consider every possible notion of the conditions of deception and you've then demonstrated that the most fundamental quality of deception is not real- namely its being hidden from us. Say then "it may be possible that in some or any way whatsoever that I am ultimately deceived, even in thinking this, and this, and this, or any possible subsequent abstraction of this thought, and even of the whole consideration that I have just laid down, ad infinitum, and then after that, ad nauseam" and you demonstrate that your awareness can constantly pull down the veil of ultimate deception, but there will always be things outside those considerations you say? Well what about the notion that wherever your mind is (that previous thought experiment, for example, or anywhere else where the suspicion of deception is possible) ultimate deception is not.This does not mean that you can't have false ideas or be wrong- but it means you're wrong or false about something- that you don't know what is, by believing what's not; so although one may be false in this way, ultimate reality fails to be- false, and remains what it is.

Poems


(various poems I've written, most were a while back, recent ones at bottom; most of these were written spontaneously in a brief sitting to capture a sentiment)

....

The boat beat against the dock,
let it go let it go,
the wind blows and the waves rock,
as the boat beat against the dock.
It pulls but the ropes strain,
and each hug gets knocked,
let it go let it go,
and the ropes break.

....

you have taken the closeness out of all my friendships,
the heat from cups of tea,
you'll hear gulps- no need to sip,
and shouts- for no one's near me.
bring back the puzzle-pieced memories,
that paint our picture when we're fitted;
and it's not much but bring back the steam,
so my nose can agree,
and foggy windshields bring back memories.
what's your name, again, do you go by apathy?

....

I didn't want to think,
that this was the best part of me,
I put the cup on the table, oops,
meant to put it on the desk,
does that happen when you're aware of possibilities?
If there's no such thing as mistakes like these,
Maybe what I do is the clearest reality of what you know but I don't see as me;
If you're right then it's not quite tentative,
but that's the only catalyst on which I've been focusing.

....

It was without ceremony that time split the bond between our cordial seams,
and it was a void that filled the distance between you and me.
There was no grand parade,
nor would there be bended knee,
that sent us parting or that held us blessed to be.
We could have been together never,
or forever bonded we could be,
but betwixt two extremes there was no room for you with me.
No root to take hold,
no soil to catch the seed,
I feel like an empty vessel,
water runs right through me.
There is no dedication,
no marked spot for some to see,
just an empty open space,
where a firmly rooted tree,
will forever never be.

....

I do not occupy favored seats,
nor sit down to eat choicest meats,
but if I did it would not matter,
these things would only make me sadder.
I am not invited nor do I host,
I am not called upon to receive nor beckoned to give a toast.
But truth be told I don't quite care,
within it all there lies a snare.
A man is not the center of,
this universe of endless things,
for beyond his time the sun will shine,
and in the morning birds will sing.
The world itself is well equipped,
to turn on him whose selfishness,
drinks til the last drop of wine is sipped,
and laughs til there are no more quips.

....

Society wants a Storm in a Tea Cup:

Poured from the fountain of life,
to the cup I settle and simmer,
I am bold I am hot I can be smelled!
I'm approached with caution and sipped for joy.
O behold, make note of this,
some are sedated,
and I have been doused with cream,
the heat immediately tempers as the last faint vapors flee,
I'm left with a lesser version,
a neutralized me.

....

I have a spirit.
Face me and you will see I have a spirit.
You have a spirit also, you have been terrorized in your spirit,
and this terror was not a response to a physical threat,
but a threat aimed at the precious items of your heart.
What you feel is eternal, but you are not,
and you know this for you fear the body you are,
but you dread the soul which must depart upon your mortal end,
and on to a fixed place your spirit goes.
Anchor, then, your heart and the eternal substance of true feeling there in,
and flee your mortal ways.
Lift your heart to God,
and set your body's work to employ itself to service of people,
and be then a blessing.

....

Reflections on Plato's Republic Ch. 16:

Why does the mouth curse,
when it is the finger that taketh the blow?
Or the hands-
why do they grope and clench about the eyes,
when it is the eye that feeleth the dashing and gouging of pain?
Does our body not wobble and a single leg hop about,
when the toe alone has been stubbed and hindered?

Does not the mouth receiveth its food from the fingers of the hand?
So it curses!
Do not the hands feeleth and grope at the command of these eyes?
So they grieve at the loss of sight!
Has not the body learned to balance upon the share of both legs?
So it is thrown upon a world of imbalance at the impairment of either!

Why then, if these parts are one,
do I feel no loss at the ailment of a brother or sister in Christ?
Are we not one, under thy Lord's command?
We know too little, and have a want of felt need for each other.

I know too little, and have a want of felt need for others.

....

So much weight behind those eyes,
like you've been sent to look but you just can't find,
and a waiting heart that sits dull too,
but I see a brighter light,
and it seems to be shining through.

....

Broken systems, broken systems,
oh how you remain so consistent,
in your ability to dismantle human functions,
as if the law weren't made for man,
but man for broken systems,
where the heart is misunderstood,
and so love is put so distant.

....

What's this script I'm in called "life"?
I forget what take I'm on,
I keep laughing through my lines.

....

I build the sandcastle of my life as quick as I can,
because I see the waves of time that come rushing in.

....

Your mind is powerful indeed,
your faith keeps shape-shifting things;
If you felt love would you tell me,
those words beautifully breathed.
The sun rises and the wind brings its warmth to me,
but if I was asleep I wouldn't see a thing,
and I wouldn't know what it is I was feeling.

....