[first posted 12/11/13]
The distinction between, or dual operation of, the moral and intellectual reasons for decisions and behavior. There's a sense in which we're rational and hold ourselves to it- even demanding intellectual understanding for things we might believe; I think there's also a moral dimension that drives our decisions and can include or not include intellectual understanding- a sense, whether intellectually verified or not, that we ought to behave in a certain way- either somewhat inherent or contingent- a natural moral sense or also a contingent moral sense which assessing that if something is true then it requires a certain moral behavior from me, which then may be acted upon even without intellectual understanding. One may be acting morally while still working out their intellectual understanding, and they may or may not continue their behavior based on the role they think intellectual understanding should play- but I at least think its a peculiar (at least to say not everyone takes account of and appreciation for the fact) aspect of being human (finite, temporal/in-time, yet rational) that we're sort of forced to make, or to forego, decisions about things we don't fully understand. So I think there is a role for moral and intellectual drive in our decision making process; or perhaps may be distinguished as moral drive and intellectual consideration- which then becomes part of our moral drive. I think one could then operate on one and not the other- one could be acting on moral (natural or contingent) drive while working out intellectual consideration/understanding; also, one may believe something (or understand) intellectually without acting on it morally (and I use "moral" somewhat loose, like ethical, but not excluding traditional sense of right/wrong, but including more- like ones contingent goals, or subjective/objective sense of duty, etc.). This would include someone intellectually having reason for something- exercising for health, recycling for ecology, etc., but not acting on it- perhaps not having moral reason for it, which seems almost ironic but this occurs and thus may suggest another element of decision making- that which affects our use of moral sense and intellectual consideration- our values. Thus you may sense or know something but not value it. The other consideration might be that someone who intellectually understands something but doesn't morally respond doesn't actually intellectually understand. So the relationship between moral drive and intellectual understanding may need to be further understood to assess how they correlate to decision making.
[. . . a thought; please take with a grain of salt, take it for what it's worth]
What a song is
8 years ago
1 comment:
This one had me thinking way back Wes, but I share your thoughts on it. Several years ago, I was in a philosophy class. The professor was talking about the difficulty in moral reasoning for people today. We went further into analysis than simply deciding right or wrong from a good versus bad perspective. So it was in line with what you were saying, i.e. moral reasoning is not just about values but also the right contingent response to what is going on right now.
The professor made a distinction that has stayed with me to this day and which I use in making daily decisions, moral or otherwise. His division was akin to yours but also very different. He grouped both types of understanding and decision making into one intelligence with two functions: speculative and practical. He called them, for the sake of discussion at least, the speculative intellect and the practical intellect.
The speculative function receives knowledge and judges, analyzes, and pieces things together in an abstract way. To me, I think this is what most people think of as the mind or intellect. The practical function takes the knowledge of the speculating mind and judges what and how to apply it to activity. The practical intellect then spurs the will to act. In contemporary terms, thought leads to behavior. However, thoughts and behavior can be at variance. So the bridge between the speculative intellect and the practical is not always well put together. Nor that between the practical intellect and the will.
With contingent responses, I think a person observes their surroundings and then decides something like: is it a good idea to pull out when that car is speeding down the road? They make a decision based on the observations like how fast is the car going, is their room for both of us, will I get hurt if hit, how critical will the injuries be, etc. But with moral-value responses, it is not obvious that someone may be doing something similar. It could go something like this:
By observation of the world around someone, he knows the whole is greater than it's parts, even when they are combined. Its only a quantitative observation. From there, though, he may apply the idea to his surroundings in a more abstract manner. He may start to conclude that his group of friends and family are a little 'greater' than his private world and concerns. So then he judges 'I should be unselfish and considerate of them.' He tries to make decisions based on the 'virtues' of humility and sacrifice. These are moral-value decisions. They are more than deciding what is the next best thing to do. Nevertheless, they grew from simple observation of the world, like the simple mathematic principle that the whole is greater than the parts.
So, from this take on the intellect and choices, moral decision-making of both kinds depends on the intellect and not separated from it. I see them working in conjunction, the one needing the other, but not in a reciprocal fashion. It seems like their relationship is top down.
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